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Wild rhesus monkeys have been found to attend to causal anomalies,
suggesting that they make inferences about possible and impossible
physical transformations in the absence of direct relevant experience.Juan-Carlos Go´mez
Causality and how we understand
it have been the subject of intense
scholarly debate. The eighteenth
century Scottish philosopher David
Hume (see [1,2]) influentially
argued that all we know is that
one event repeatedly occurs after
another — for example, a ball
moves after being hit by
another — and we call this
causation, but we cannot see
or logically demonstrate
cause–effect connections, the
impression of causation derives
from repeated experience. In
contrast, others [1,3] have
suggested that the notion of
cause is a primitive of the human
mind through which we make
sense of experience, including
novel events.
Indeed, humans know that
certain things will or will not happen
without having experienced them.
For example, I know that by
throwing my mobile phone, but not
my wallet, I may break a window
glass, without having actually tried
this ever. We can predict this on the
basis of the physical properties of
the objects involved — glass is
fragile and breakable, my mobile is
hard, whereas my wallet is soft. In
some cases our ability to predict
novel outcomes likely derives from
the vast number of experiences,
with an extraordinary variety of
objects, we accumulate over
a lifetime. But some impressions of
causality, such as the launching
effect of a ball hitting another,
might require little or no
experience — indeed, 6-month-oldhuman infants show awareness of
such effects [4].
Do other animals have such
a sense of causality? Ever since
scientists started to study animal
minds, they debated whether
animals blindly learn to associate
actions with outcomes through
repeated experience, or react
insightfully to new situations. In
effect, the animal intelligence
debate is about whether animals
can or cannot understand the
causal connections between
actions and objects [5]. Some
suggest that even chimpanzees,
with their well-known tool-using
skills, commit too many glaring
errors in experimental tasks to be
credited with genuine causal
understanding [6]. Others argue
that chimpanzees show a natural
sense of causality, even outside
the tool-using domain: for
example, they choose containers
that make a noise when shaken
as the ones that must contain
food, but find it difficult to learn
an arbitrary cue, such as a
tapping sound, associated with
food containers, even after
repeated experience [7]. This
suggests that they spontaneously
pay attention to causal relations.
This debate has just been
enriched by Hauser and
Spaulding’s [8] report that rhesus
monkeys — a non-tool-using
species with little interest in objects
which is relatively distant from
humans — understand causal
relations involving tools. The
authors showed wild rhesus
monkeys sequences such as those
illustrated in Figure 1. In oneexample, an experimenter placed
an apple on a platform, erected
a screen, then lowered and lifted
a knife behind the screen. When the
screen was removed, the apple
appeared cut in two halves.
Alternatively, the same
sequence — from intact apple to
halved apple — was shown, but
instead of a knife the experimenter
lowered a drinking glass behind the
screen. In both cases the
experimenter surreptitiously
replaced the whole apple with
a halved one. Humans would
assume that, in the first sequence,
the experimenter cut the apple with
the knife, but they would find
surprising the same outcome in the
sequence with the glass. We know
that knives, but not glasses, have
the causal power of cutting.
How can we tell what the
monkeys thought of these
sequences? Hauser and Spaulding
[8] applied a technique that
developmental psychologists use
with human babies: they measured
how long the monkeys looked at the
cut apple in each sequence, on the
assumption that monkeys, like
babies, would look longer at
anything violating their
expectations. And they found that
the monkeys indeed looked longer
at the ‘impossible’ outcome of an
apple cut with a glass than at the
‘possible’ outcome involving the
knife. Moreover, they also looked
longer at the impossible event of
a cut apple reappearing as a whole
apple after using a knife behind the
screen, which suggests that
monkeys were not acting on a loose
association between knives and cut
pieces of food, but paid attention to
the order of events. Similar results
were obtained with a different
transformation: a white piece of
cloth dyed with blue paint versus
the same effect involving a knife.
The news is not just that rhesus
monkeys may show causal
understanding of a type until now
Dispatch
R539reported only in highly trained
laboratory chimpanzees [3]. More
surprising is that the monkeys had
no direct experience of using
knives, dyes or other tools. And,
according to the new report [8],
their vicarious experience of seeing
human visitors cut food with
knives, drink with glasses or dye
with paint was very limited, if any at
all. It seems that the monkeys have
either a fabulous capacity for
vicarious learning of causal
relations in one-off events or, as
Hauser and Spaulding [8] suggest,
a natural tendency to draw novel
causal inferences from their
general knowledge of objects,
including objects they have never
personally handled. Although the
report may downplay the amount
of causal experience of the
monkeys — surely they spend
much time daily picking and
chewing food items, and
experiencing the resulting
transformations — their
performance in the looking tests
remains impressive.
But can we really infer so much
from looking times? Does an
average extra second and a half of
attention justify the attribution of
sophisticated causal knowledge to
the monkeys? In developmental
psychology, looking time has been
used to argue for complex physical
and social knowledge in very young
infants incapable of complex
actions [9], but there is some
controversy about the significance
of such measures. Most agree
that looking time does reflect
some form of early knowledge,
but there is disagreement about
how similar this is to the
knowledge used in explicit
adaptive action [10].
Looking time methods pose
a special problem when applied
to non-human primates.
Perception–action mismatches in
human infants can be understood
as transitional phases in the
development of mature skills. But
what is the point of permanent
perception–action mismatches in
adult monkeys? Why does
a species that rarely uses objects
have such an astonishing ability to
understand the causal mechanics
of objects used by others? What is
the evolutionary point of acquiring
knowledge that is not put toPossible
Possible
Impossible
Impossible
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Figure 1. Some of the pos-
sible and impossible se-
quences shown by Hauser
and Spaulding [8] to rhesus
monkeys.
The monkeys looked signif-
icantly longer (3.65 seconds
on average) to the impossi-
ble outcomes than to the
possible ones (1.96 sec-
onds on average) during the
10 seconds following the
withdrawal of the screen.
(Adapted with permission
from [8].)practical use? [11]. Is this a
by-product of more general
abilities that do have an adaptive
impact? Perhaps attending to ‘odd’
events is advantageous in other
areas in which the monkeys do
develop adaptive actions, but here
they just look longer without
knowing why their attention is
caught by sequences such as
‘apple-glass-cut apple’? But then
what exactly catches their eye if not
the causal anomalies of glasses
cutting apples and knives
colouring clothes?
Hauser and Spaulding’s [8] study
is an important and exciting
contribution to the body of
evidence contradicting Hume’s
assumptions about causal
cognition. Causal understanding of
novel object relations may be an
evolutionary primitive of cognition
requiring a relatively modest
amount of experience with objects,
and not the result of generalising
from human-like massive object
experience. But it is also
a challenging reminder of the need
to address the riddle of the contrast
between perceptual knowledge
and knowledge for adaptive action,
which now matters not only in
cognitive development but also in
cognitive evolution.References
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